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Abstract
We analyze the effectiveness of public works programs (PWP, Arbeitsbeschaffungs-
maßnahmen) in east Germany as measured by their effects on individual future re–
employment probabilities in regular jobs.  These are estimated by discrete hazard
rate models on the basis of individual–level panel data.  We account for unobserved
individual heterogeneity in both the PWP participation and in the outcome
equations.  In the latter, we differentiate between transitions into "stable" and
"unstable" employment after the PWP.  We find that these programs seem to have
no special targeting focus on disadvantaged groups in the labor market and that
participants are, on average, worse off concerning their re–employment prospects in
regular jobs than unemployed people who do not join such a program. A possible
explanation for this result is that PWP participants search less intensively for a
regular job while on such a program than unemployed non-participants.  Thus, our
results cast serious doubts on both the effectiveness and the equity aspects of public
works programs in east Germany.
Non–Technical Summary
There has been surprisingly little research on the employment effects of public
works programs (PWP) which have been used extensively to cushion the
repercussions of the restructuring process on the east German economy.  Following
the microeconometric approach to the evaluation of the employment effects of labor
market programs, we estimate re–employment probabilities of PWP participants and
unemployed non–participants in regular jobs, where we distinguish between stable
and unstable employment.  Stable employment is defined as obtaining regular
employment within twelve months after the spell has ended and being still
employed at the end of this period.  The employment effects of these programs are
estimated separately for men and women and for two subperiods on the basis of the
east German Labor Market Monitor covering the period 1990 to 1994.
Our results on the effectiveness of public works in bringing people back into stable
employment are not encouraging.  We find that public works participants are, on
average, worse off in terms of individual re–employment prospects than
unemployed people who do not join a public works program. A possible
explanation for this result is that PWP participants search less intensively for a
regular job while on such a program than unemployed non-participants.  However,
we cannot find any evidence for the hypothesis that there are disincentive effects to
take up regular jobs due to an allegedly high level of relative earnings in PWP.
Furthermore, these programs seem to have no special targeting focus on
disadvantaged groups in the labor market.  Our results therefore cast serious doubts
on both the effectiveness and the equity aspects of public works programs in east
Germany.  Given the scale of PWP in terms of participants and expenditures, policy
makers may reconsider the role of public works programs as an active labor market
policy tool.  Since related research for east Germany has shown that training
programs increase participants' re–employment prospects relative to unemployed
job search, we conclude that a re–allocation of expenditures for "active" labor
market policy rather than overall expenditure reductions could increase its
effectiveness.
11 Introduction
The economic restructuring process in east Germany was accompanied by a
dramatic rise in registered unemployment from virtually zero just before Monetary,
Economic and Social Union on the 1st July, 1990 to a recent level of about 20
percent.  But even this dramatic increase in unemployment only partially reflects the
severe labor market problems in east Germany.  Without the implementation of
"active" labor market programs on a large scale, registered unemployment would
have soared to about 30% (Sachverständigenrat, 1997, p. 150 ff).  Hence, these
programs are supposed to play an important role in smoothing the adjustment of the
east German labor market during the transition process.  Although the mix of these
programs changed over the transition period, public works programs (PWP) started
to play a prominent role early on.  They reached an all–time high in 1992 when the
average number of participants in PWP was about 400,000 people and public
expenditures amounted to almost 9 billion Deutsche Marks.  Since then, the size of
these programs has been sharply reduced: in the year 1997 the average stock of
PWP participants was reduced to about 200,000 persons with expenditures of about
DEM 6.6 billions.  This is a similar amount as is currently spent on publicly
financed training programs in east Germany (cf. Kraus, Puhani, and Steiner, 1997).
Proponents of PWP claim that these programs are "self–financing" in the sense that
their costs are compensated for by savings on unemployment benefits and social
security contributions on the one hand, and higher tax receitps associated with a
higher employment level on the other.  However, according to some rough
calculations, costs on these programs seem to exceed the sum of direct savings and
additional income generated by any macroeconomic employment effects by a large
margin (cf. Autorengemeinschaft, 1997; Sachverständigenrat, 1998, p. 153).  Critics
of PWP also claim that public works compete with private production and, due to
the huge wage subsidies, displace jobs in the private sector of the economy.
Furthermore, participants in these programs are said to be discouraged to search for
a regular job because public works jobs have to offer contract wages which often
exceed wages for comparable work in the private sector of the economy.  Although
these claims are often raised in policy debates on the usefulness of PWP in east
Germany, there is hardly any empirical evidence supporting or disproving them.
There are various aims public works programs should achieve according to the
criteria set out in the Work Support Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) and related
special regulations by the Federal Labor Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit), see
Wolfinger and Brinkmann (1996) for a discussion.  One important objective of
PWP is to offer employment opportunities especially to those unemployed people
who, because of personal characteristics such as disability, old age, or lack of
qualification, have great problems finding employment in the market sector of the
economy, and would therefore become long–term unemployed.  This is the so–
2called target–group objective (Zielgruppenorientierung) set out in the Work
Support Act.  Given the very high level of unemployment in east Germany, the
authorities have not adhered to this criterion very strictly, though.  Another
important official objective of PWP is to re–integrate people into regular
employment.  It is the prevailing view of those concerned with the implementation
of these programs that they should offer only temporary employment opportunities
and thus act as a "bridge" to a regular job in the market sector of the economy
(Buttler, 1992).  Furthermore, according to the Work Support Act these jobs should
also lead to "stable" employment.
This paper focuses on the effectiveness of public works programs in east Germany
with respect to this latter objective.  We view PWP as an alternative to the passive
policy of just paying unemployment benefits and compare the re–employment
prospects of PWP participants with the counterfactual outcome had the participants
been unemployed during the period of the PWP.  We extend previous work on the
employment effects of PWP in east Germany by Steiner and Kraus (1995) who, on
the basis of the east German Labor Market Monitor, only investigated the period
1990 to 1992 using a somewhat different methodological approach.  In particular,
they did not differentiate between stable and unstable employment and only focused
on the short–term employment effects of PWP.  These authors find that women have
higher chances to become re–employed from unemployment than from public
works.  For men, the authors find hardly any difference in re–employment
probabilities from public works and on the one hand and unemployment on the
other hand.  On the basis of more recent data from the Labor Market Monitor and
using various econometric models, Hübler (1997a) reports negative employment
effects of PWP for men, and insignificant effects for women.
In Germany, experimental data for the evaluation of labor market programs are not
available.  There are various approaches to the evaluation of the employment effects
of public works and other labor market programs on the basis of non–experimental
data (see, e.g., of Heckman and Robb, 1985, Heckman and Hotz, 1989, Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd, 1997).  In this study, we apply the microeconometric approach
to evaluate the employment effects of PWP.  To this end, we estimate hazard rate
models from public works or unemployment into stable employment on the basis of
all eight waves of the east German labor market monitor which covers the period
1990 to 1994.  We find that public works programs seem to have no special
targeting focus on disadvantaged groups in the labor market and that participants
are, on average, worse off in terms of individual re–employment prospects than
unemployed people who do not join such a program.  However, we do not find any
evidence for the hypothesis that there are disincentive effects to take up regular jobs
due to an allegedly high level of earnings in PWP.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we briefly
describe the structure and development of public works programs in east Germany.
3Our evaluation methodology and the data are described in section 3.  In section 4
we present and discuss the estimation results focusing on the employment effects of
public works programs, and section 5 concludes.
2 The Development and Structure of Public Works Programs
in East Germany
Public works programs (PWP) are considered an important part of "active" labor
market policy by the German government and the Federal Labor Office.  After
unification, PWP have been extended tremendously to ease the east German
transition process.  In view of the dramatic employment decline in east Germany
these programs have not only been used as a means to keep people off the dole and
to avoid social hardship associated with long–term unemployment.  They were also
intended as investment in the east German industrial infrastructure, such as the
cleaning–up of environmental damages and the closing–down of obsolete plants
(see, e.g., Buttler and Emmerich, 1994).  As stipulated by the Work Support Act
(Arbeitsförderungsgesetz), activities undertaken under a PWP should be "useful" for
society but, at the same time, must not compete with private production, i.e., there
must not be a potential market supply even if there is demand for such goods.
Obviously, both criteria are not easy to meet simultaneously.
To account for the special east German situation, public works programs were not
restricted to non–profit organizations, wage subsidies could amount to 100%
including social security contributions, and costs for machinery and material were
also usually covered by the labor office.  Although these special regulations were
initially legislated to expire by the end of 1992, they were prolonged until 1995.
Since then, a 100% wage subsidy is only paid if working–time is reduced by 20%.
This allows earnings in public works jobs to be reduced without interferring with
collective bargaining agreements, which effectively set a minimum wage for those
firms covered by such agreements.  At the same time, a special form of wage
subsidy was introduced, known as "Productive Work Support East" (Produktive
Arbeitsförderung Ost).  Under this scheme, jobs can be subsidized up to the average
amount of unemployment benefits and social security contributions.  These special
regulations were to expire by the end of 1997, but have recently been prolonged in
view of the still desastrous labor market situation prevailing in east Germany.  In
the following, we aggregate these two types of programs because they have the
same labor market objective, namely to get people off the dole and to integrate them
into regular employment.
The scope of PWP in east Germany is unique in both the national and international
context (see, e.g. Puhani and Steiner, 1996; OECD, 1997).  As Figure 1 shows, the
number of public works participants peaked in the first half of 1992 with over
400,000 people employed on such schemes. The following decline can be explained
4by changes in institutional regulations rather than in improved labor market
conditions.  After an intermittent increase in the number of PWP participants, fiscal
pressure and the increasing disenchantment of economic policy makers with PWP
finally led to a downsizing of the number of participants to some 200,000 in the last
quarter of 1997.
Figure 1—Expenditures on and participants in PWP
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Except for the most recent severe expenditure cuts, the decline in the number of
participants in public works after 1992 was not reflected in the development of
public works expenditures (see Figure 1).  The reason is that PWP became more
cost–intensive when large–scale programs—so–called Mega–PWP and Societies for
Employment Promotion and Structural Development (ABS–Gesellschaften)—were
established.  Mega–PWP have a funding of more than DEM 3 million and more
than 150 people per program with a focus towards infrastructure and environmental
re–development (Spitznagel, 1992).  The task of the Societies for Employment
Promotion and Structural Development is to employ and qualify people within the
framework for public works programs set by the Federal Labor Office.  At the
beginning of 1995, they employed about 150,000 people in public works or
financed by the special form of wage subsidy mentioned above (cf. Wolfinger and
Brinkmann, 1996, p. 344).
According to calculations by the Research Insitute of the Federal Labor Office
(Autorengemeinschaft, 1997), in the year 1996 the total costs for a PWP participant
amounted to almost DEM 50,000 per year.  These costs include the subsidies for
labor costs and social security contributions as well as costs for material and
machinery.  To some extent, these costs are balanced by savings of unemployment
5benefits and social security contributions.  Additional savings are generated to the
extent PWP induce increased production and employment elsewhere.  Taking these
indirect effects into account, the net yearly costs per participant in PWP reduce to
about DEM 20,000, which exceeds the costs of paying unemployment benefits by
about 50%. However, net costs of PWP would have to be reduced to the extent
activities in public works produce value for society.  Of course, in the absence of
market prices it is not obvious how to make such a calculation.
Because PWP were, and still are, very much oriented towards structural policies, the
targeting criteria as set out in the Work Support Act were loosened for east
Germany.  Whereas the main target group in west Germany are unemployed people
with certain characteristics which substantially reduce their chances of getting a
regular job, like disability, old age and, especially long–term unemployment, in east
Germany these are not necessary requirements to get into a PWP.  Instead, many
people enter PWP directly from employment, e.g. in the case of mass redundancies.
For the large–scale programs referred to above there seem to be no binding
targeting criteria at all.
Information on the structure of public works participants, which gives some
indication on the issue of the targeting focus of PWP, can be obtained from the
LMM.  These data show that the composition of PWP participants has markedly
changed over time (see, e.g., Bielenski, Retzlaff, and von Rosenbladt, 1995,
Bielenski and Margvas, 1997).  Whereas in 1991 40% of public works participants
were female, their share increased to about 68% by 1994, which roughly
corresponds to the female share in unemployment.  In 1994, 19% of all PWP
participants were university graduates, compared to just 5%  in 1991. The share of
participants with a degree from polytechnical school is also rather high (16% in
1994), but has remained fairly stable over time.  People with a higher occupational
qualification were therefore supported by PWP far above their share in total
unemployment.  Old age, which is closely related to the incidence of long–term
unemployment, is another important factor for PWP participation, and there are
special regulations for long–term unemployed people above 50 years of age.
Participants in PWP earn, on average, considerably less than employees in regular
jobs.  Data from the Labor Market Monitor (LMM) of the Federal Labor Office
show that average net monthly earnings in public works jobs amounted to about
DEM 1,500 in November 1994 (the last wave of the LMM), while average net
earnings in a regular job were about DEM 2,000 at that time (see also Spitznagel
and Magnas, 1997).  Substantial earnings differentials between public works and
regular jobs also exist within economic sectors and qualification groups.  Since
information on working hours is not available in the LMM, we cannot tell to what
extent these differentials also persist on an hourly basis.
6Since employment in public works is limited to a fixed time period, normally 12
months, participants can be expected to search for a regular job during the duration
of the program.  In the period November 1990 to November 1992 (1994) about 40%
(25%) of all PWP ended prematurely, where the drop in this share is probably
related to the worsening of labor market conditions in east Germany (Spitznagel and
Marvas, 1997).  Of those PWP which expired in the observation period about 14%
were hired by the public works firm and 25% ended with a transition into a regular
job, while about half of all participants were left without a job (Spitznagel and
Marvas, 1997, Table 96).  We now turn to the question what these numbers tell us
about the success of PWP.
3 Evaluation Methodology and Data
Our evaluation of the employment effects of PWP is based on a microeconometric
model.  To implement this model, we need to define an appropriate observable
outcome variable, specify how PWP might affect this variable, and account for
other observable and unobservable factors which may affect the outcome variable
aside from having previously been on a PWP.  Since an important criterion for the
evaluation of a PWP in east Germany is its potential to increase the future re–
employment probability of formerly unemployed people in regular jobs, we
compare the re–employment probabilities of participants in such programs with the
counterfactual outcome had they remained unemployed instead of entering a public
works program.  A particularly difficult problem arises from the potential selectivity
of participation in PWP, i.e., its dependence on those factors which also determine
the outcome variable.
3.1 Treatment of Potential Selection Bias
The essence of the sample selection problem is that participants in PWP may differ
from the non–participants, who act as the comparison group, in both observed and
unobserved characteristics. If this potential selectivity bias is not taken into account,
one is likely to obtain biased estimates of the employment effects of PWP.  The
standard econometric solution to this problem is to correct for potential selectivity
bias in the outcome equation on the basis of a PWP participation equation estimated
for the combined sample of participants and non–participants in PWP.
The outcome and participation equations are
Y X D uijt it j j it it
*
’= + +β δ
D Z vit it it
*
’= +γ
7where Yijt*  is the latent index which defines the outcome variable of interest for
individual i.  In our context, this outcome is the hazard rate from either
unemployment or PWP into labor force state j, i.e., the conditional probability to
leave unemployment (PWP) for that state in time period t, given the individual has
been unemployed (in PWP) until time t.  The second equation refers to the selection
into public works, where Dit*  is the latent index which determines the transition from
unemployment into public works at time t for individual i. Selection–bias can arise
through a correlation between u and Z (selection on observables), or through a
correlation between u and v (selection on unobservables), or both.
As for the selection on observables, it can be treated by the linear control function
estimator (see, for example, Heckman and Hotz, 1989).  The idea here is to assume
that the conditional expection of u given X and Z is linear in Z. In this case,
including the Z variables in the outcome equation controls for selection on
observables.  To account for selection on unobserables, we assume the following
error–components specification for the outcome and selection (PWP participation)
equations
uit i it= +ε η
and
vit i it= +µ ξ
ε i
m
 and µ lm are time–invariant individual effects with expectations E iε  = E iµ  = 0,
and variances E iε 2  = σ ε2  and E iµ 2  = σ µ2 .   it  and  it  are identically and
independently distributed error terms which vary both with time and across
individuals, with E itη  = E itξ  = 0, and variances E itη 2  = ση2  and E itξ 2  =
σξ
2
.  Furthermore, we assume that the error components in each equation are
uncorrelated with each other and that the time–varying component is serially
uncorrelated.
If we impose the restriction that the covariance between uit and vis is constant for all
t and s, it can be shown that the correlation between the error terms in the PWP
participation and the respective outcome equation has a rather small upper bound
(see the appendix).  In particular, in the case where we have no unobserved
individual heterogeneity in both the participation and outcome equations, this
bound is given by 1/T where T is the total number of intervals (months) observed.
In our application T = 50 months, which implies an upper bound for the correlation
coefficient of 0.02. In the appendix we also show numerically that the correlation
between u and v becomes negligible if there is no unobserved heterogeneity in
either of the two equations.
8As we show below on the basis of the estimated heterogeneity components in the
outcome and the PWP participation equations, the effects of unobserved
heterogeneity seem in fact to be negligible in our application.  Hence, it seems safe
to ignore unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of the employment effects of
PWP and control for selectivity by including the same observed variables as in the
outcome equation in the participation equation.
3.2 Specification of the Outcome and Participation Equations
Since our data base contains information on the duration an individual has spent in
unemployment or a PWP, we specify our outcome and participation equations as
hazard rate models.1   This has the great advantage that both the time spent in
unemployment or in a PWP spell and the time between its completion and the
beginning of a subsequent employment spell can be taken into account.  Thus, both
calendar–time effects and process–time effects ("duration dependence") can be
allowed for in the comparison of future employment outcomes of PWP participants
and previously unemployed non–participants.  As Ham and LaLonde (1996) stress,
this may be important in order to effectively control for selectivity bias if (un–)
employment duration is the outcome variable.  Because the duration data are only
observed in monthly intervals in the LMM we specify discrete hazard rate models.
The hazard rate for transitions from unemployment or a PWP into labor force state j
in discrete process time t is the probability of exit into state j at time t conditional on
the event that the person has remained in unemployment (in PWP) up to time t – 1.
In our application, the j exit states from unemployment are public works programs,
employment, and other labor force states in the PWP participation model and
"stable" employment, "unstable" employment, and non–employment in the outcome
models.  The definition of the exit states differs between the participation and
outcome models.  In the participation model, we specify the hazard rate from
unemployment into PWP with employment and other labor–force states as the
remaining exit states.  Other labor force states include short–time work, retirement,
unemployment, training and re–training, and out–of–the–labor–force.
The distinction between the exit states in the outcome models is intended to capture
the effect of public works on the stability of the subsequent regular employment
spell to some extent, given the relatively short observation period.  These states are
defined as
− stable employment: the person finds regular (i.e., not subsidized) employment
and is still employed in the twelfth month after the end of the spell. Regular
                                          
1
 See Ridder (1986), Gritz (1993), Ham and LaLonde (1996), and Hujer, Maurer and Wellner
(1997) for similar applications.
9employment does not include short–time work, public works or vocational
training.
− unstable employment: the person finds a regular job during the twelve months
after the end of a spell spent unemployed or in PWP but leaves it before the end
of the twelve–months' period.
− non–employment: the person is not regularly employed for even one month
during the twelve–months' period after the spell ended, where employment in
active labor market programs is also included in this category.
If the person is still in public works or unemployment at the end of the observation
period, or if the employment status is missing at least for one out of the twelve
months for any reason, spells in the outcome models are treated as right–censored
in the estimation.
Note that there is a given "risk period" of 12 months for each observation starting
immediately after the end of the PWP (unemployment) spell.  This is a very
important condition for the comparability of the outcome variable between
individuals, which is often not observed in evaluation studies based on comparisons
of outcomes at particular points in time, as is the case for pure panel studies.  Our
definition of stable employment takes into account that, due to the well–known
length bias in stock–sampling, someone who is employed at a particular point in
time is likely to be observed in the middle of a relatively long employment spell
(see also Winter–Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1996).  Hence, an interrupted employment
spell of, say, six months at the end of the risk period of twelve months is to be
interpreted differently with respect to an individual's employment stability
compared to a completed six–months' employment spell, i.e. non–employment at
the end of the risk period.
Of course, we cannot tell whether an employment spell is really stable because we
do not observe the employment history of the people in our sample after November
1994.  However, our classification procedure at least assures that those who find
employment within the first twelve months after their public works or
unemployment spell, but lose their job before the twelfth month, are correctly
identified as not having gained stable employment within the risk period.  Indeed,
using the likelihood ratio test for equality of coefficients in the multinomial logit
model proposed by Cramer and Ridder (1991), we found that stable and unstable
employment according to our classification are in fact two distinct states.
For the outcome models, the hazard rate is formally defined as
λ ε εijk i im ik ik i imt x t T t J j T t x t( ) = = = > − ( ), Pr , , ,  1
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where k denotes the kth spell in unemployment or public works, j denotes the jth exit
state,   captures unobserved individual heterogeneity, and xi(t) is a time varying
vector of observed covariates. Note that there can be more than one unemployment
or public works spell per person, and these spells are correlated due to the
heterogeneity term.  The distribution of   is specified non–parametrically with the
restrictions
E i i
m
i
m
m
M
ε ε ε= =
=
∑ Pr  01 , and Pr ε immM   ==∑ 11 ,
where M is the number of discrete mass points necessary to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in the sample (see, e.g., Heckman and Singer, 1984).  It is assumed
that   is orthogonal to the time–varying covariates xi(t).
The hazard rate in the kth spell in unemployment or PWP into state j at time t is
specified as
λ ε
α β ε
α β εij
k
i i
m j j i i
m
l l i i
m
l
Jt x t
t x t
t x t
( ) = ( ) + ′ ( ) +
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=
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,
where αj(t) are process time dummy variables specifying a non–parametric baseline
hazard. Assuming the spells of different persons are independent, the likelihood
function for the sample is given by
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where δijk equals one if the kth spell of individual i ends in state j at time t, and zero
otherwise.  Note that the standard assumption that spells are independent across
individuals in the sample, need not hold in the population as a whole.  In fact, for
the latter this assumption is likely to be violated if subsidized employment in PWP
resulted in the substitution of non–subsidized jobs.
We estimate a participation model for the transition from unemployment into public
works and two outcome models. The first (second) outcome model refers to the
transition of participants in PWP (unemployed non–participants) into stable
employment and other labor force states, respectively.  By estimating the outcome
models for the group of participants and the group of non–participants separately,
we allow the coefficients of all explanatory variables to differ between the two
groups.2
                                          
2
 This is equivalent to estimating the model jointly for trainees and non-trainees with all
explanatory variables interacted with the training dummy.
11
Using standard numerical optimization procedures, the likelihoold function is
maximized with respect to the coefficients on the baseline hazard, the coefficients
on the explanatory variables and the mass–points together with the corresponding
probabilities, P mε , taking into account the restrictions on the individual effects
given above.
3.3 Data and Variables
The Labor Market Monitor (Arbeitsmarktmonitor, LMM) of the Institute of Labor
Market Research (IAB) of the German Federal Labor Office is a representative
panel survey of the east German working–age population. The panel contains eight
waves. They refer to the months of November 1990, March 1991, July 1991,
November 1991, May 1992, November 1992, November 1993, and November
1994. In the first wave about 0.1 percent of the working–age population or 10,751
persons had been interviewed. Extra samples were added to the original sample in
waves 5 and 6. All of these persons were interviewed in each wave following their
admission into the sample, except they died, moved to west Germany, or refused
finally to answer3. Nevertheless, the sample size shrunk down to 5,377 observations
in wave 8 (November 1994).
The LMM contains information on socio–economic characteristics like age and
education, participation in various active labor market policy measures, and an
individual's employment status at the date of interview in each wave. From the first
wave onwards the interviewees were asked when they participated in public works.
From this information we constructed spells on the labor force state with monthly
information. The spells were constructed for the period of January 1989 to
November 1994.  The following table shows the distribution of exits from
unemployment and public works programs.  The exit states in the PWP participation
model refer to the employment state in the first month after the transition from the
unemployment state.  For the outcome models, the exit states are defined as
described in section 3.2.
                                          
3 A general introduction to the LMM is provided by Hübler (1997b).
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Table 1—Target labor force states in the PWP participation and outcome models
participation model unemployment
model
public works
 model
exit into absolute percent absolute percent absolute percent
stable employment — — 518 16.73 153 21.31
unstable employment — — 151 4.88 67 9.33
employment (full– or part–time) 818 23.35 — — — —
public works 553 15.79 — — — —
other labor force states 703 20.06 — — — —
non–employment — — 724 23.39 107 14.9
right–censored 1,429 40.79 1,702 54.99 391 54.46
total 3,503 100 3,095 100 718 100
Source: LMM, waves 1 – 8; own calculations.
The same set of control variables is included in both the PWP participation and the
outcome models.  Aside from personal characteristics they include firm size,
industry and regional dummies, indicators of an individual’s previous employment
history, and income variables.  These are the income replacement ratio for
transitions into regular employment and the real value of unemployment benefits or
earnings in a PWP for transitions into non–employment.  These variables are
included in the outcome models to test for disincentive effects in individual (un–)
employment behavior related to the allegedly high level of, respectively,
unemployment benefits and earnings in public works relative to the expected
earnings in regular employment.
As for the unemployment benefit variables, the unemployed usually give the
amount of benefits they receive at the date of interview.  In case an unemployment
spell falls between two dates of an interview, we set the replacement ratio at the
value of 63 percent, which is the institutionally determined replacement ratio for a
person without children (see Steiner, 1997).  For all other cases, the income
replacement ratio in the unemployment model is estimated by dividing the amount
of unemployment benefits by the expected net wage in regular employment.  This
latter variable is obtained from empirical wage equations.  For transitions from
PWP, the income replacement ratio is defined by the ratio of earnings in public
works relative to expected earnings in regular employment.  In about 10 percent of
all cases the earnings information in public works was missing.  In these cases,
earnings were therefore imputed on the basis of empirical wage equations estimated
on the sample of employees in regular jobs and in PWP.  To save space, these and
the estimates of an unemployed person's expected wage in regular employment are
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not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.  All amounts are
in 1990 Deutsche Marks.
We split the observation period into two subperiods, viz. January 1989 to August
1992, and September 1992 to November 1994, respectively.  This is motivated by
the institutional changes that took place during the observation period, i.e., the
increasing importance of large scale works programs (cf. section 2).  Futhermore,
Kraus, Puhani and Steiner (1997) found that employment effects of publicly
financed training problems in east Germany differed markedly between these two
subperiods.  Since PWP are to some extent probably substitutes for publicly
financed training programs, it seems natural to split the observation period
accordingly.  Kraus, Puhani and Steiner (1997) also found important gender
differences both with respect to the participation in and the employment effects of
publicly financed training programs, and we therefore also differentiate between
males and females in our estimations.  For these two subperiods, means and
definitions of the exogenous variables are given in the appendix in Table A1 for the
public works model and in Table A2 for the unemployment model.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Sample Selectivity
We test for potential selectivity bias due to the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity by comparing the maximum likelihood values between models with a
different number of mass points for the heterogeneity component in both the
participation and outcome equations. In addition, we use the Akaike Information
Criterium (AIC).  The values of (minus two–times) the natural logarithms of the log
likelihood (LnLik) and the AIC from our estimated hazard rate models (see Tables
A3 and A4 in the appendix) are given in the following table.4
Table 2—Tests for unobserved heterogeneity in the PWP participation and outcome models.
unobserved public works model unemployment model participation model
heterogeneity –2LnLik AIC –2LnLik AIC –2LnLik AIC
0 mass points 3,055.44 −1,621.72 11,733.90 −6,015.95 15,187.27 −7,776.64
                                          
4 This transformation of the maximum log-likelihood forms the basis of the standard likelihood-
ratio test.  For the null hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity, the likelihood ratio statistic
violates standard regularity conditions and its distribution is therefore not known (see, e.g.,
Gritz, 1993).  AIC is defined as AIC = LnLik – k, where k is the number of parameters in the
model. The decision rule is to take the model with the highest AIC (see, e.g., Greene 1997, p.
401).
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2 mass points 3,011.48 −1,601.74 11,727.02 −6,014.51 15,184.88 −7,777.44
3 mass points 3,010.40 −1,603.20 11,727.02 −6,016.51  
Source: Estimated hazard rate models (see Tables A3and A4 in the appendix).
According to the AIC, we have two heterogeneity mass points in both the public
works and unemployment models.  There is no significant heterogeneity component
in the PWP participation model.  As Table 3 shows, the estimated heterogeneity
components are significantly different from zero in the public works model but not
in the unemployment model.  According to our discussion in section 3.1, this
implies that the correlation between the error terms in the participation and outcome
equations must be fairly small.  As shown in the appendix, in the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity in just one of the outcome equations the upper bound for
the correlation between u  and v  is still below 0.15.  In order to find out whether
this order of correlation has an effect on the estimated coefficients in the outcome
model, we carried out a small simulation study.  The result was that the effect is
negligible.5  We, therefore, argue that we can, after conditioning on the set of
observable explanatory variables in the participation model, ignore the bias due to
the selection on unobservables in the outcome models.
Table 3—Estimates of the heterogeneity components for the outcome models with two mass–
points
public works model unemployment model
estimate t–value estimate t–value
ε1 1.3098 6.79 −0.0008 0.0060
ε2 –3.1670 –7.34 0.0007 0.0000
Pr(ε1) 0.7074 23.65 0.4539 0.0109
Pr(ε2)=1−Pr(ε1) 0.2926 9.78 0.5461 0.0131
Source: Estimated hazard rate models (see Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix).
4.2 Participation in Public Works
To save space, estimation results from the PWP participation equation are not
reported in this paper but are available from the authors upon request.  Here, we just
summarize the most important estimation results.  Regarding the selection of PWP
participants according to age or occupational groups no general pattern emerges
                                          
5
 We simulated a multinomial logit model with only a constant and three exit states on the basis
of 1000 observations and 100 replications. The results are available from the authors upon
request.
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from these estimates.  Our results rather support the hypothesis that virtually all
types of workers in east Germany were given equal access to PWP.  This conclusion
has to be modified slightly regarding highly skilled workers who, ceteris paribus,
have better chances of getting into public works than people from other
occupational groups (the effects were only significant at the 10 percent level,
however).  Except for men in the first period, people from east Berlin have higher
chances of receiving a placement in a PWP than people from other states.
As can be seen from Figure 2, most unemployed people who are selected into a
PWP in east Germany join the program after their sixth month in unemployment.
Hence, these programs were targeted to some extent on the long–term unemployed,
although this effect became less pronounced in the second subperiod.  The figure
also shows that, for both men and women, the average hazard rate is higher in the
first period, which mainly reflects the subsequent overall increasing number of
unemployed people.  In the first period, men were far more likely to get into PWP
than women.  The political wish to support more women through public works,
however, markedly reduced the gender difference in the hazard rate from
unemployment into PWP in the second period.  This resulted in women's
participation in PWP being more in line with their high share in overall
unemployment.  Whether this has also resulted in improved re–employment chances
in regular jobs for females will be investigated in the following section.
Figure 2—Hazard rates from unemployment into PWP
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Source: Estimated hazard rate models; hazard rates are calculated at mean values of the explana–
  tory variables for the respective sub–groups; see text.
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4.3 Employment Effects
Estimation results for our hazard rate models are given in Tables A3 and A4 in the
appendix.  In order to improve on the efficiency of the estimation, we reduced the
number of parameters by excluding all variables with associated t–values of less
than 1.64 in a first–round estimation.  However, the income variables were always
included because we are especially interested in the quantitative importance of the
hypothesized disincentive effects of, respectively, the level of unemployment
benefits and earnings in PWP relative to expected earnings in regular employment.
The reported results are the second–round estimates.  All explanatory variables are
included as interactions with a dummy for gender and a time–period dummy, and
there is no global constant in the model.  In essence, this specification almost
amounts to estimating the models separately for all four groups. We have, however,
specified a common baseline hazard in the outcome models in order to keep the
number of estimated coefficients at a reasonable level relative to the number of
available observations.
17
Figure 3—Hazard rates from unemployment and PWP into stable employment
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Figure 4—Hazard rates from unemployment and PWP into non–employment
men
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Process Time (Months)
H
a
za
rd
 
ra
te
from PWP 1st period
from PWP 2nd period
from unemployment 1st period
from unemployment 2nd period
women
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
0,07
0,08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Process Time (Months)
H
a
za
rd
 
ra
te
from PWP 1st period
from PWP 2nd period
from unemployment 1st period
from unemployment 2nd period
19
In the following, we discuss the effects of participation in PWP on the probabilities
to find stable employment or to become non–employed subsequently to the PWP.
Because of the small number of observations of exits into unstable employment (cf.
Table 1), we prefer not to interpret the results referring to this state.  We first
present results concerning the short–run employment effects of being placed in a
PWP relative to remaining unemployed, before we look at the employment effects
of public works from a somewhat different perspective on the basis of cumulated
transition probabilities.
Short–Run Effects
Public works programs are typically offered for a period of up to 12 months.
However, as mentioned in section 2, a large share of all public works spells end
prematurely.  This indicates that PWP participants are already searching for regular
employment long before the expected end of the program looms.  It, therefore,
seems of interest to investigate whether a participant's re–employment prospects
already improve during the expected duration of a PWP relative to those of an
unemployed non–participant, i.e., to look at the short–run employment effects of
PWP.  Following Steiner and Kraus (1995), we interpret the difference in the hazard
rates from public works and unemployment into regular employment as the short–
run effect of PWP.  However, in contrast to these authors we distinguish between
stable and unstable employment as defined above. Given that our controls for
observed and unobserved characteristics effectively remove all differences other
than participation in PWP between the two groups, the difference in the hazard rates
between the group of participants and the simulated hazard rate had this group
stayed unemployed can be interpreted as the causal short–run employment effect of
public works.
Hazard rates from unemployment and PWP into stable employment for males and
females and for the two subperiods are plotted in Figure 3; these are evaluated at the
respective subsample means.  For men the plots show that the likelihood of finding
a regular job is higher when unemployed than when participating in a public works
program.  This is true for both periods, but in the second subperiod the difference
between the two hazard rates is much smaller than in the first period.  This change
is due to the dramatic drop in the hazard rate from unemployment between the first
and second period, whereas the hazard rate from PWP changed little between the
two periods. Hazard rates from unemployment exceed those from PWP throughout
the duration of the respective spell, and there is only a very small increase in the
PWP hazard after the 12th month when these programs normally expire.
Evaluated at sample means, female hazard rates are generally at a much lower level
than those for males at their respective sample means.  Unemployed women have a
somewhat higher hazard rate into stable employment than those participating in a
PWP.  However, taking into account the generally low level of the estimated
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hazards, this difference seems negligible for both periods.  In relative terms, there is
a marked increase in the female PWP hazard rate after the 12th month, but the
quantitative effect of this change on the re–employment probability is small.  Like
for men, even for long durations the female PWP hazard rate never obtains the (low)
level of the respective hazard rate from unemployment into regular employment.
These rather negative results regarding the effectiveness of PWP are somewhat
modified if the effect of public works on the hazard rate into non–employment is
taken into account.  Even if PWP were ineffective in getting people directly back to
regular employment, they still may have positive effects if they keep participants
searching for work.  As Figure 4 shows, participants in public works are indeed less
likely to leave the labor force than people on the dole. Although this may give
credence to the mentioned hypothesis, another plausible explanation for this
observation is that participation in public works renews the entitlement to
unemployment benefits and thus creates strong incentives to stay on the register
longer than non–participants.  Hence, it seems difficult to evaluate the efficiency of
PWP on the basis of the participants' lower hazard rate into non–employment.
The hypothesis that the assumed high level of earnings in public works relative to
expected earnings in a regular job create disincentive effects to take up such jobs is
not supported by our estimation results.  As Table A3 shows, the income
replacement ratio is always insignificant, except for the estimates referring to
women in the first period where it just obtains the 10% significance level.
Although this may be related to the instrumenting of the expected earnings variable,
the point coefficient estimates of the income replacement ratio also imply relatively
small effects on the PWP hazard rates.  Likewise, the income variables are never
statistically significant in the unemployment hazard rate model.  Hence, the
hypothesis that the level of the income replacement ratio has a quantitiatively
important impact on individual re–employment probabilities is not supported by our
estimation results.
Cumulated Transition Probabilities
An alternative way to look at the effectiveness of PWP from a somewhat different
perspective is to compare the cumulated transition probabilities into stable
employment of participants in PWP and the comparison group of unemployed non–
participants over a certain period.  We choose a period of twelve months to take into
account the fact that most PWP are initially expected to last no longer and that a
large fraction of them ends prematurely.  Hence, we define the employment effect of
public works as the difference of the cumulated transition probabilities (ctp) from
PWP and unemployment into stable employment within the first 12 months of the
respective spell.
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Formally, the cumulated transition probability after t months is defined as
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where S denotes the survivor function and λj is the transition rate into state j in
discrete time  .  The survivor function gives the probability of still remaining in
unemployment (in PWP) after t months.  The 12–months' ctp  into stable
employment of person i thus is the probability that person i has found stable
employment within the first 12 months after the beginning of the PWP or
unemployment spell.  The 12–months' ctp for the transition into unstable
employment and non–employment have an analogous interpretation.  For each
person, S and   can be derived given parameter estimates from the discrete hazard
rate models described above.  The simulated ctp for both groups can then be
obtained by plugging the x(t)–variables of the PWP participants into the outcome
models for the two groups.  This gives the 12–months' ctp for the PWP participants
had they not been on such a program.
Cumulated transition probabilities into stable employment for men and women in
the two subperiods are plotted in Figure 6. The graphs for the first period show that
the mass of the distribution of the 12–months' ctp from PWP for men is
concentrated on the support [0.15, 0.3], i.e., the probability of regaining a regular
job within 12 months after entering public works lies between 15 and 30 percent for
most participants. There are hardly any PWP participants whose cumulated re–
employment probability exceeds 30 percent. In contrast, in this period re–
employment probabilities for unemployed non–participants were distributed rather
evenly over the whole support with some thinning–out at the lower and upper ends
of the distribution.  For women, the difference between the distribution of the 12–
months' ctp from PWP and unemployment is less pronounced with the mass of the
distribution being concentrated on the supports [0, 0.15] and [0, 0.35], respectively.
In the second period, there is some convergence in the ctp from PWP and from
unemployment for both men and women, i.e. the re–employment chances in regular
jobs for the unemployed non–participants have deteriorated to a greater extent than
for PWP participants.  For men, the leftward–shift of the PWP ctp distribution is
accompanied by a larger variance, whereas the dispersion in the female distribution,
if anything, has become somewhat smaller.
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So far we have seen that, on average, the public works participants would have been
better off in terms of re–employment chances by not joining a public works program
and just staying unemployed. In order to see whether there are certain subgroups
who do benefit from public works programs, we plot the conditional distributions of
the ctps  of PWP participants given their ctp  out of unemployment in the three–
dimensional graphs of Figure 6.  The graphs have the following interpretation. Take
a point on the unemployment axis, say 0.2. If you slice the mountain at that point
parallel to the public works axis, you get the distribution of the ctp into stable
employment after public works for the unemployed who would have had a ctp of
0.2 without public works. If the mountain were a diagonal slice from the north–west
to the south–east of the cube, then public works would have no effect whatsoever.
As can be seen from all four graphs, most public works participants have a very low
ctp irrespective of their ctp  from unemployment.  Except for men with a very low
ctp from unemployment, there are hardly any people who benefit from public
works.  However, even for them the ctp  from public works is still very low.
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Figure 5—Cumulated transition probability (ctp) from unemployment and from PWP into
stable employment (Kernel density estimates)
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Figure 5 (cont.)
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Figure 6—Distributions of the cumulated transition probability (ctp) into stable employment
from PWP conditional on ctp from unemployment (Kernel density estimates)
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Figure 6 (cont.)
women — first period
0 0,175 0,35 0,525 0,7 0,875
0
0,125
0,25
0,375
0,5
0,625
0,75
0,875
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
C
o
n
di
tio
n
a
l D
en
sit
y
Ctp from Public Works
Ctp from 
Unemployment
women — second period
0 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.6 0.75 0.9
0
0.15
0.3
0.45
0.6
0.75
0.9
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
C
o
n
di
tio
n
a
l D
en
sit
y
Ctp from Public Works
Ctp from 
Unemployment
27
5 Summary and Conclusions
Following the microeconometric approach to the evaluation of the employment
effects of labor market programs, we have estimated hazard rate models of re–
employment probabilities where we distinguish between stable and unstable
employment in regular jobs subsequent to participation in public work programs
(PWP).  The employment effects of these programs are estimated separately for men
and women and for two subperiods on the basis of the Labor Market Monitor
covering the period 1990 to 1994.  We have accounted for selection bias by
controlling for a fairly large number of observable characteristics and also allowed
for unobserved heterogeneity in both the outcome and participation equations.
Although unobserved heterogeneity in the outcome models may lead to some
correlation between the error terms in the participation and outcome equations, we
have shown that it will be of small order.  This implies that, after controlling for a
large number of observable characteristics in the outcome equations, selectivity bias
is likely to be negligible in our application.
Although we could not detect any significant disincentive effects to take up regular
jobs due to an allegedly high level of relative earnings in public works, our results
on the effectiveness of public works in bringing people back into stable
employment are not encouraging.  Indeed, we have found that public works
participants are, on average, worse off than unemployed people who do not join a
public works program, and this holds for both males and females and for the whole
time period analyzed.  A possible explanation for this result is that PWP participants
search less intensively for a regular job while on such a program than unemployed
non-participants.  Furthermore, PWP also seem to have no special targeting focus
on groups with special labor market problems.  Our results rather support the
hypothesis that, except for skilled workers and those living in east Berlin who had
somewhat better chances of getting into public works, virtually all types of workers
in east Germany were given equal access to these programs.  This is clearly not
compatible with the officially held view that PWP are aimed at disadvantaged
groups in the labor market.
For proponents of public works programs these results are even more unpleasant
than those obtained in previous studies by Steiner and Kraus (1995) and Hübler
(1997a) who reached the conclusion that public works have no effect on individual
re–employment probabilities in regular jobs.  Thus, empirical research casts serious
doubts on both the effectiveness and the equity aspects of public works programs in
east Germany.  Therefore, policy makers may rethink the role of public works
programs as an active labor market policy tool.  As recent empirical research for
east Germany has shown (for a summary see Kraus, Puhani, and Steiner, 1997),
training programs seem to increase participants' re–employment prospects relative
to unemployed job search. Hence, taking into account the substantial net fiscal costs
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per participant in public works, a re–allocation of expenditures for "active" labor
market policy rather than overall reductions could increase its effectiveness.
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Appendix
Deriviation of an Upper Bound for the Correlation of the Errors in the
Participation and Outcome Equations
In section 3.1, we have specified the error terms in the outcome and participation
equation as
uit i it= +ε η
and
vit i it= +µ ξ
where the error terms are distributed as specified in the text.  From this specification
it follows that
cov , cov ,u u E E Eit is i it i is i it i is i it i is= + + = + + − + +ε η ε η ε η ε η ε η ε η  
                = + + + − = =E Ei i i it i is it is i iε ε ε η ε η η η ε ε σ ε0 2  = constant   ∀ ≠t s ,
and, analogously,
cov ,v vit is = σ µ
2
= constant ∀ ≠t s .
Imposing the restriction
cov , cov
,
u vit is u v= = constant ∀t s, ,
we get the following correlation matrix of the residuals
Corru v
u v
u v
,
,
,
=
	






1
1
1
1
1
1
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ε ε
ε ε
ε ε
µ µ
µ µ
µ µ

  


  

with ρ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ σ σε ε µ µ= = = ×2 2 2 2/ , / , cov /,u v u v u v         and   u,v  
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For ρ ρε µ= = 0, the eigenvalues of this matrix are 2(T–1) times 1, + T uvρ , and
− T uvρ . Because this matrix has to be positive definite, all eigenvalues have to be
positive. From 0+ >T uvρ  and 0− >T uvρ , it follows that
1 1 1 2 2+ − = −T T Tuv uv uvρ ρ ρ    > 0 implying / T uv> ρ . Thus, in the case of no
unobserved heterogeneity in both the participation and the outcome equation, / T
is the upper bound for uv. If there is unobserved heterogeneity in either equation,
that upper bound for ρuv can be found numerically by increasing ρε  and ρµ  in the
correlation matrix until it is no longer positive definite.
The following graph shows the result of this calculation for the upper bound of uv.
As the plot shows, for either ρε  or ρµ  equal to zero the upper bound for the
correlation between u  and v  becomes very small.
Upper bound for the correlation between u and v  for T=50
00,140,28
0,420,560,7
0,840,98 0
0,14
0,28
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0,56
0,7
0,84
0,98
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
ρ
ρ
ρ
u,v
ε
µ
Source: own calculations.
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Table A1—Descriptive statistics for the public works model
Variable Men
1st
Period
Men
2nd
Period
Women
1st
Period
Women
2nd
Period
age<= 25 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.05
25 < age <= 35 0.23 0.17 0.28 0.29
age > 50 0.25 0.34 0.26 0.27
married 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.75
with children 0.56 0.41 0.59 0.72
no vocational training 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.13
semi–skilled worker 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.04
master craftsman / technician 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.05
vocational college 0.09 0.12 0.29 0.18
university degree 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.12
20 – 200 employees 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.33
200– 2000 employees 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.15
more than 2000 employees 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03
primary sector 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.16
construction industry 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.02
tertiary sector 0.23 0.32 0.47 0.56
public employee 0.37 0.41 0.52 0.53
training out of the job 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.20
Mecklenburg – Vorpommern 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.13
Brandenburg 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13
Sachsen – Anhalt 0.17 0.24 0.16 0.17
Thüringen 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.22
Berlin (East) 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.09
previously in short–time work 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.06
previously in unemployment 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.38
previously out of the labor force 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.21
previous duration in short–time work 8.19 9.25 8.37 10.36
previous duration in employment 13.52 13.14 16.15 13.03
previous duration in unemployment 4.17 7.61 5.22 10.66
previous duration out of labor force 5.51 5.69 8.71 7.52
continued ./.
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Table A1—Descriptive statistics for the public works model (ctd.)
Variable Men
1st
Period
Men
2nd
Period
Women
1st
Period
Women
2nd
Period
entry in the first quarter of a year 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.17
entry in the second quarter of a year 0.23 0.21 0.33 0.20
entry in the third quarter of a year 0.37 0.32 0.34 0.35
current quarter is the first of the year 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.06
current quarter is the second of the year 0.25 0.12 0.37 0.08
current quarter is the third of the year 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.17
current year is 1992 0.39 0.25 0.59 0.17
unemployment benefits / expected earnings in employment 1.04 0.95 1.00 0.95
net earnings in public works 1034.17 1209.86 1028.84 1120.09
unemployment rate 7.14 9.01 14.87 19.62
month in process time, first period
month 2 – 6 0.45 0.00 0.24 0.00
month 7 – 11 0.18 0.00 0.28 0.00
month >= 12 0.18 0.00 0.25 0.00
month in progress time, second period
month 13 – 18 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.24
month 19 – 23 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.14
month >= 24 0 0.14 0.00 0.14
mean duration 6.12 13.86 7.19 14.30
(subsample size / sample size) × 100 22.70 26.60 15.32 35.38
Source: LMM; waves 1 – 8; own calculations.
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Table A2—Descriptive statistics for the unemployment model
Variable Men
1st
Period
Men
2nd
Period
Women
1st
Period
Women
2nd
Period
age<= 25 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.08
25 < age <= 35 0.26 0.20 0.32 0.25
age > 50 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.28
married 0.62 0.61 0.74 0.75
with children 0.52 0.46 0.69 0.61
no vocational training 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10
semi–skilled worker 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.06
master craftsman/ technician 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.04
vocational college 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14
university degree 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.07
20 – 200 employees 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.24
200– 2000 employees 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16
more than 2000 employees 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04
primary sector 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07
construction industry 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.02
tertiary sector 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.34
public employee 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.19
previously not in employment 0.47 0.34 0.49 0.39
Mecklenburg Lower Pommerania 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12
Brandenburg 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.16
Anhalt Saxony 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17
Thuringia 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16
Berlin (East) 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.05
previously in short–time working 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.15
previously in public works 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.08
previously in retraining or further training 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.23
previously out of the labor force 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.10
previous duration in short–time working 10.32 11.37 10.20 13.30
previous duration in employment 12.12 17.29 12.73 18.66
previous duration in public works 6.08 12.08 7.44 139.89
previous duration in retraining or further training 4.54 124.18 4.89 120.89
previous duration out of the labor force 7.89 120.04 88.77 108.13
continued ./.
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Table A2—Descriptive statistics for the unemployment model (ctd.)
Variable Men
1st
Period
Men
2nd
Period
Women
1st
Period
Women
2nd
Period
entry in the first quarter of a year 0.25 0.14 0.26 0.15
entry in the second quarter of a year 0.18 0.25 0.22 0.31
entry in the third quarter of a year 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.29
current quarter is the first of the year 0.24 0.10 0.25 0.07
current quarter is the second of the year 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.18
current quarter is the third of the year 0.29 0.10 0.29 0.08
current year is 1992 0.22 0.28 0.33 0.22
unemployment benefits / expected earnings in employment 0.39 0.60 0.44 0.64
unemployment benefits 466.68 718.00 411.87 599.06
unemployment rate 67.32 91.78 32.37 193.32
month in process time, first period
month 2 0.13 0 0.12 0
month 3 0.16 0 0.11 0
month 4 0.09 0 0.09 0
month 5 0.10 0 0.10 0
month 6 0.08 0 0.08 0
month 7 0.04 0 0.07 0
month 8 – 9 0.07 0 0.09 0
month 10 – 12 0.07 0 0.08 0
month >= 13 0.05 0 0.08 0
month in process time, second period
month 7 – 9 0 0.18 0 0.19
month 10 – 12 0 0.14 0 0.12
month 13 – 18 0 0.13 0 0.15
month >= 19 0 0.10 0 0.21
mean duration 4.55 8.67 5.54 11.70
(subsample size/samplesize) × 100 24.23 12.84 35.55 27.39
Source: LMM, waves 1 – 8; own calculations.
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Table A3—Public works model: exit into stable employment and into non–employment
exit into stable
employment
exit into
non–employment
Variable coeff. t–value coeff. t–value
men, first period
constant –2.9978 –5.01 –3.2522 –3.92
public employee –1.1285 –2.61
missing values in firm–specific variables 1.4835 2.33
net earnings in public works –0.0013* –1.71
net earning in PWP / expected income in regular empl. –0.7748 –1.44
men, second period
constant –2.6061* –1.81 –1.4374 –0.77
semi–skilled worker 2.2675 4.75
20 – 200 employees –1.3172 –2.03
construction industry 2.7100 4.88
tertiary sector 1.2644 2.22
public employee –1.4532 –2.99
missing values in firm–specific variables 2.3207 4.05
Mecklenburg – Vorpommern 2.9793 2.47
Thüringen 2.0691 3.20
previously in short time work 2.9568 3.52 4.0732 4.11
previously in unemployment 2.3861 2.69
previous duration in short–time work –0.2357 –3.70 –0.3664 –4.34
previous duration in unemployment –0.415* –1.80
current quarter is the first of the year –0.5171 –1.38
net earnings in PWP –0.0017 –1.47
net earning in PWP / expected income in regular empl. 0.2979 0.45
unemployment rate –0.3581 –2.92 –0.4146 –2.34
continued ./.
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Table A3—Public works model: exit into stable employment and non–employment (ctd.)
exit into stable
employment
exit into
non–employment
Variable coeff. t–value coeff. t–value
women, first period
constant –5.8654 –5.71 –5.5199 –6.38
20 – 200 employees 1.027 2.24
missing values in the firm–specific variables 3.3045 4.72 3.7552 5.01
Brandenburg 0.6115 1.06
previously in short–time work 1.2923* 1.96
previously in unemployment –2.0554 –2.29
previous duration in employment 0.0922 4.57
previous duration in unemployment 0.1103 1.45
previous duration out of the labor force 0.141 2.45 0.1077 2.86
entry in the second quarter of a year 1.0865 2.24 1.1475* 1.72
entry in the third quarter of a year 0.9157 1.42
income / expected income –1.1824* –1.67
income –0.0005 –0.81
women, second period
constant –8.1386 –7.97 –7.0502 –7.94
age > 50 1.4235 2.52
married 1.4989 2.83 0.8861* 1.90
with children 0.4001 2.45 0.6244 2.85
vocational college 1.1485 2.90
Brandenburg 1.9258 3.57
entry in the first quarter of a year 1.5561 3.15
current quarter is the first of the year –0.5171 –1.38
income / expected income –0.2554 –0.29
income –0.0007 –1.04
month in process time, first period
month 2 – 6 –0.82 –3.29 –0.8706 –2.64
month 7 – 11 –1.0109 –2.98
month > 11 0.9071 2.31
month in process time, second period
month 13 – 18 1.2879 3.26 2.1752 4.97
month 19 – 24 1.5976 4.48 2.1171 4.39
month >24 3.8986 6.26 3.7337 4.26
Note:  Shaded values indicate statistical significance at the 5%, a star at the 10% level.
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Source: LMM, waves 1 – 8; own calculations.
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Table A4—Unemployment model: exit into stable employment and into non–employment
exit into stable
employment
exit into
non–employment
coeff. t–value coeff. t–value
men, first period
constant –3.0293 –7.02 –4.2624 –13.15
age > 50 –1.4998 –5.71 0.4823 2.66
married 0.6346 3.42 0.5473 2.79
with children –0.4396 –3.04
no vocational training –0.6838 –1.53
semi–skilled worker –0.4942 –1.45
master craftsman / technician 0.3263 1.34 0.4100 2.02
university degree 0.2711 1.26
20 – 200 employees 0.7861 3.55
200 – 2000 employees 0.8748 3.89
more than 2000 employees 0.9836 2.84
previously not in employment –0.5919 –2.91
Mecklenburg – Vorpommern –0.5571 –2.33
Sachsen – Anhalt 0.3819* 1.92
previously in retraining or further training 1.0858 4.27
previously out of the labor force –1.0263* –1.84 0.3182 1.05
previous duration out of the labor force 0.1189 3.91
entry in the first quarter of a year –0.4488 –2.05 –0.7952 –3.44
entry in the second quarter of a year –0.8324 –3.00 –0.6837 –2.90
entry in the third quarter of a year –0.4696 –2.16 –0.4734 –2.41
current quarter is the second of the year –0.5936 –2.73
unemployment benefits /expected earnings in employment 0.1635 0.49
unemployment benefits 0.0000 –0.20
unemployment rate 0.0942 2.23 0.0914 2.38
continued ./.
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Table A4—Unemployment model: exit into stable employment and non–employment (ctd.)
exit into stable
employment
exit into
non–employment
Variable coeff. t–value coeff. t–value
men, second period
constant –2.1978 –2.16 –5.8529 –10.55
25 < age <=35 0.4264 1.24
age > 50 –2.1026 –3.94 0.6543 2.22
married 0.6974 2.05
with children –0.3315* –1.75
no vocational training 0.3745 0.63
master craftsman / technician 1.4678 4.32
vocational college 0.6081* 1.93
primary sector –1.7042 –2.41
tertiary sector 0.5936* 1.77
previously not in employment –1.6262 –3.99
Mecklenburg – Vorpommern 1.3857 2.31
Thüringen 0.8529 2.06
previously in public works 1.5434 2.17
previously out of the labor force 0.3198 0.70
previous duration in employment –0.0369 –2.63
previous duration in public works –0.0823 –2.15 –0.1807 –2.15
entry in the first quarter of a year –1.5453 –3.06 –0.9413 –2.00
entry in the second quarter of a year –1.6224 –3.30 –0.6065 –1.63
entry in the third quarter of a year –1.1090 –2.68
current quarter is the first of the year 1.8376 2.83
current quarter is the second of the year 1.6099 2.45 1.5910 3.65
current quarter is the third of the year 1.0392 2.45
current year is 1992 1.9371 3.82 2.6793 6.93
unemployment benefits /expected earnings in employment 0.6133 0.83
unemployment benefits 0.0003 0.75
unemployment rate –0.3138 –3.56
continued ./.
43
Table A4—Unemployment model: exit into stable employment and non–employment (ctd.)
exit into stable
employment
exit into
non–employment
Variable coeff. t–value coeff. t–value
women, first period
constant –3.5176 –16.22 –4.5875 –19.96
age > 50 –1.2512 –4.54 0.3172 2.61
with children –0.3209 –2.58
no vocational training –0.5208 –2.69
semi–skilled worker –0.7464* –1.94 –1.1948 –3.66
vocational college 0.4169 2.10
university degree 1.0012 4.32
more than 2000 employees 0.4028 1.62
tertiary sector 0.6773 3.88
public employee –0.2596 –1.19 –0.2514 –1.54
Mecklenburg – Vorpommern –0.2511 –1.36
Thüringen –0.3174* –1.92
previously in retraining or further training 0.5962 3.33
entry in the second quarter of a year –0.3960 –2.76
current quarter is the first of the year 0.6540 4.67
current quarter is the third of the year 0.6346 4.78
current year is 1992 –0.5502 –3.56
unemployment benefits /expected earnings in employment 0.0180 0.06
unemployment benefits 0.0001 0.37
unemployment rate 0.0826 4.63
continued ./.
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Table A4—Unemployment model: exit into stable employment and non–employment (ctd.)
exit into stable
employment
exit into
non–employment
Variable coeff. t–value coeff. t–value
women, second period
constant –4.1261 –10.29 –7.6350 –15.17
age <= 25 0.7704 2.10
age > 50 –1.2415 –3.33 0.4556* 1.77
with children 0.3301 3.08
no vocational training 0.7016* 1.88
construction industry 1.3168 2.44
previously not in employment –0.5881 –1.97
Thüringen 0.2495 0.97
previously in short–time work 1.6278 2.93 0.6274 2.27
previously in retraining or further training 1.7504 3.55* 1.6612 4.17
previously out of the labor force 1.2457 4.02
previous duration in short–time work –0.0691* –1.91
previous duration in retraining or further retraining –0.1066 –2.04 –0.1384 –2.85
entry in the first quarter of a year –1.8874 –4.37
entry in the second quarter of a year –1.3153 –3.69
entry in the third quarter of a year –0.6736 –2.27 0.5874 2.80
current quarter is the second of the year 1.1572 4.10
current year is 1992 1.3128 4.92 2.1354 7.67
unemployment benefits /expected earnings in employment –0.4868 –1.40
unemployment benefits 0.0015 3.83
month in process time, first period
month 3 0.4310 2.85
month 4 – 6 0.5931 4.74
month >= 7 0.6562 5.19
month in process time, second period
month >= 7 0.3599* 1.76 0.5640 3.25
Note:  Shaded values indicate statistical significance at the 5%, a star at the 10% level.
Source: LMM, waves 1 – 8; own calculations.
